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Abstract
Deep learning models are often trained on datasets that contain sensitive information such
as individuals’ shopping transactions, personal contacts, and medical records. An increasingly
important line of work therefore has sought to train neural networks subject to privacy con-
straints that are specified by differential privacy or its divergence-based relaxations. These
privacy definitions, however, have weaknesses in handling certain important primitives (compo-
sition and subsampling), thereby giving loose or complicated privacy analyses of training neural
networks. In this paper, we consider a recently proposed privacy definition termed f -differential
privacy [18] for a refined privacy analysis of training neural networks. Leveraging the appealing
properties of f -differential privacy in handling composition and subsampling, this paper derives
analytically tractable expressions for the privacy guarantees of both stochastic gradient descent
and Adam used in training deep neural networks, without the need of developing sophisticated
techniques as [3] did. Our results demonstrate that the f -differential privacy framework allows
for a new privacy analysis that improves on the prior analysis [3], which in turn suggests tuning
certain parameters of neural networks for a better prediction accuracy without violating the
privacy budget. These theoretically derived improvements are confirmed by our experiments in
a range of tasks in image classification, text classification, and recommender systems. Python
code to calculate the privacy cost for these experiments is publicly available in the TensorFlow
Privacy library.
1 Introduction
In many applications of machine learning, the datasets contain sensitive information about individ-
uals such as location, personal contacts, media consumption, and medical records. Exploiting the
output of the machine learning algorithm, an adversary may be able to identify some individuals in
the dataset, thus presenting serious privacy concerns. This reality gave rise to a broad and pressing
call for developing privacy-preserving data analysis methodologies. Accordingly, there have been
numerous investigations in the scholarly literature of many fields—statistics, cryptography, machine
learning, and law—for the protection of privacy in data analysis.
Along this line, research efforts have repeatedly suggested the necessity of a rigorous and ver-
satile definition of privacy. Among other things, researchers have questioned whether the use of
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a privacy definition gives interpretable privacy guarantees, and if so, whether this privacy defini-
tion allows for high accuracy of the private model among alternative definitions. In particular,
anonymization as a syntactic and ad-hoc privacy concept has been shown to generally fail to guar-
antee privacy. Examples include the identification of a homophobic individual in the anonymized
Netflix Challenge dataset [45] and the identification of the health records of the then Massachusetts
governor in public anonymized medical datasets [56].
In this context, (ε, δ)-differential privacy (DP) arose as a mathematically rigorous definition
of privacy [23]. Today, this definition has developed into a firm foundation of private data anal-
ysis, with its applications deployed by Google [26], Apple [5], Microsoft [16], and the US Census
Bureau [4]. Despite its impressive popularity in both the scholarly literature and the industry,
(ε, δ)-DP is not versatile enough to handle composition, which is perhaps the most fundamental
primitive in statistical privacy. For example, the training process of deep neural networks is in effect
the composition of many primitive building blocks known as stochastic gradient descent (SGD).
Under a modest privacy budget in the (ε, δ)-DP sense, however, it was not clear how to maintain
a high prediction accuracy of deep learning. This requires a tight privacy analysis of composition
in the (ε, δ)-DP framework. Indeed, the analysis of the privacy costs in deep learning was refined
only recently using a sophisticated technique called the moments accountant [3].
Ideally, we hope to have a privacy definition that allows for refined privacy analyses of various
algorithms in a principled manner, without resorting to sophisticated techniques. Having a refined
privacy analysis not only enhances the trustworthiness of the models but can also be leveraged
to improve the prediction accuracy by trading off privacy for utility. One possible candidate is f -
differential privacy, a relaxation of (ε, δ)-DP that was recently proposed by Dong, Roth, and Su [18].
This new privacy definition faithfully retains the hypothesis testing interpretation of differential
privacy and can losslessly reason about common primitives associated with differential privacy,
including composition, privacy amplification by subsampling, and group privacy. In addition, f -
DP includes a canonical single-parameter family that is referred to as Gaussian differential privacy
(GDP). Notably, GDP is the focal privacy definition due to a central limit theorem that states that
the privacy guarantees of the composition of private algorithms are approximately equivalent to
telling apart two shifted normal distributions.
The main results of this paper show that f -DP offers a rigorous and versatile framework for
developing private deep learning methodologies1. Our guarantee provides protection against an
attacker with knowledge of the network architecture as well as the model parameters, which is in
the same spirit as [53, 3]. In short, this paper delivers the following messages concerning f -DP:
Closed-form privacy bounds. In the f -DP framework, the overall privacy loss incurred
in training neural networks admits an amenable closed-form expression. In contrast, the
privacy analysis via the moments accountant must be done by numerical computation [3],
and the implicit nature of this earlier approach can hinder our understanding of how the
tuning parameters affect the privacy bound. This is discussed in Section 3.1.
Stronger privacy guarantees. The f -DP approach gives stronger privacy guarantees than
the earlier approach [3], even in terms of (ε, δ)-DP. This improvement is due to the use of the
central limit theorem for f -DP, which accurately captures the privacy loss incurred at each
1It is noteworthy that training deep learning models has served as an important benchmark in testing a privacy
definition since the tightness of its privacy analysis crucially depends on whether the definition can tightly account
for composition and subsampling.
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iteration in training the deep learning models. This is presented in Section 3.2 and illustrated
with numerical experiments in Section 4.1.
Improved prediction accuracy. Leveraging the stronger privacy guarantees provided by
f -DP, we can trade a certain amount of privacy for an improvement in prediction performance.
This can be realized, for example, by appropriately reducing the amount of noise added during
the training process of neural networks so as to match the target privacy level in terms of
(ε, δ)-DP. See Section 3.2 and Section 4.2 for the development of this utility improvement.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.1 we provide a brief review
of related literature. Section 2 introduces f -DP and its basic properties at a minimal level. Next,
in Section 3 we analyze the privacy cost of training deep neural networks in terms of f -DP and
compare it to the privacy analysis using the moments accountant. In Section 4, we present numerical
experiments to showcase the superiority of the f -DP approach to private deep learning in terms of
test accuracy and privacy guarantees. The paper concludes with a discussion in Section 5.
1.1 Related Work
There are continued efforts to understand how privacy degrades under composition. Developments
along this line include the basic composition theorem and the advanced composition theorem [22,
24]. In a pioneering work, [32] obtained an optimal composition theorem for (ε, δ)-DP, which in fact
served as one of the motivations for the f -DP work [18]. However, it is #P hard to compute the
privacy bounds from their composition theorem [44]. More recently, [17] derived sharp composition
bounds on the overall privacy loss for exponential mechanisms.
From a different angle, a substantial recent effort has been devoted to relaxing differential pri-
vacy using divergences of probability distributions to overcome the weakness of (ε, δ)-DP in handling
composition [21, 11, 43, 12]. Unfortunately, these relaxations either lack a privacy amplification
by subsampling argument or present a quite complex argument that is difficult to use [8, 57]. As
subsampling is inherently used in training neural networks, therefore, it is difficult to directly apply
these relaxations to the privacy analysis of deep learning.
To circumvent these technical difficulties associated with (ε, δ)-DP and its divergence-based
relaxations, Abadi et al. [3] invented a technique termed the moments accountant to track detailed
information of the privacy loss in the training process of deep neural networks. Using the moments
accountant, their analysis significantly improves on earlier privacy analysis of SGD [14, 55, 10, 53,
61] and allows for meaningful privacy guarantees for deep learning trained on realistically sized
datasets. This technique has been extended to a variety of situations by follow-up work [41, 48].
In contrast, our approach to private deep learning in the f -DP framework leverages some powerful
tools of this new privacy definition, nevertheless providing a sharper privacy analysis, as seen both
theoretically and empirically in Sections 3 and 4.
For completeness, we remark that different approaches have been put forward to incorporate
privacy considerations into deep learning, without leveraging the iterative and subsampling natures
of training deep learning models. This line of work includes training a private model by an ensemble
of “teacher” models [47, 46], the development of noised federated averaging algorithms [42], and
analyzing privacy costs through the lens of the optimization landscape of neural networks [59].
3
2 Preliminaries
2.1 f-Differential Privacy
In the differential privacy framework, we envision an adversary that is well-informed about the
dataset except for a single individual, and the adversary seeks to determine whether this individual
is in the dataset on the basis of the output of an algorithm. Roughly speaking, the algorithm
is considered private if the adversary finds it hard to determine the presence or absence of any
individual.
Informally, a dataset can be thought of as a matrix, whose rows each contain one individual’s
data. Two datasets are said to be neighbors if one can be derived by discarding an individual from
the other. As such, the sizes of neighboring datasets differ by one2. Let S and S′ be neighboring
datasets, and ε > 0, 0 6 δ 6 1 be two numbers, and denote by M a (randomized) algorithm that
takes as input a dataset.
Definition 2.1 ([23, 22]). A (randomized) algorithm M gives (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for any
pair of neighboring datasets S, S′ and any event E,
P(M(S) ∈ E) 6 eεP(M(S′) ∈ E) + δ.
To achieve privacy, the algorithm M is necessarily randomized, whereas the two datasets in
Definition 2.1 are deterministic. This privacy definition ensures that, based on the output of the
algorithm, the adversary has a limited (depending on how small ε, δ are) ability to identify the
presence or absence of any individual, regardless of whether any individual opts in to or opts out
of the dataset.
In essence, the adversary seeks to tell apart the two probability distributions M(S) and M(S′)
using a single draw. In light of this observation, it is natural to interpret what the adversary does
as testing two simple hypotheses:
H0 : the true dataset is S versus H1 : the true dataset is S
′.
The connection between differential privacy and hypothesis testing was, to our knowledge, first
noted in [58], and was later developed in [32, 39, 9]. Intuitively, privacy is well guaranteed if the
hypothesis testing problem is hard. Following this intuition, the definition of (ε, δ)-DP essentially
uses the worst-case likelihood ratio of the distributions M(S) and M(S′) to measure the hardness
of testing the two simple hypotheses.
Is there a more informative measure of the hardness? In [18], the authors propose to use the
trade-off between type I error (the probability of erroneously rejecting H0 when H0 is true) and
type II error (the probability of erroneously accepting H0 when H1 is true) in place of a few privacy
parameters in (ε, δ)-DP or divergence-based DP definitions. To formally define this new privacy
definition, let P and Q denote the distributions of M(S) and M(S′), respectively, and let φ be any
(possibly randomized) rejection rule for testing H0 : P against H1 : Q. With these in place, [18]
defines the trade-off function of P and Q as
T (P,Q) : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1]
α 7→ inf
φ
{1− EQ[φ] : EP [φ] 6 α}.
2Alternatively, the neighboring relationship can be defined for datasets of the same size and differing by one
individual.
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Above, EP [φ] and 1 − EQ[φ] are type I and type II errors of the rejection rule φ, respectively.
Writing f = T (P,Q), the definition says that f(α) is the minimum type II error among all tests
at significance level α. Note that the minimum can be achieved by taking the likelihood ratio test,
according to the Neymann–Pearson lemma. As is self-evident, the larger the trade-off function
is, the more difficult the hypothesis testing problem is (hence more privacy). This motivates the
following privacy definition.
Definition 2.2 ([18]). A (randomized) algorithm M is f -differentially private if
T
(
M(S),M(S′)
)
> f
for all neighboring datasets S and S′.
In this definition, both T and f are functions that take α ∈ [0, 1] as input and the inequality
holds pointwise for all 0 6 α 6 1, and we abuse notation by identifying M(S) and M(S′) with
their associated distributions. This privacy definition is easily interpretable due to its inherent
connection with the hypothesis testing problem. By adapting a result due to Wasserman and
Zhou [58], (ε, δ)-DP is a special instance of f -DP in the sense that an algorithm is (ε, δ)-DP if and
only if it is fε,δ-DP with
fε,δ(α) = max
{
0, 1− δ − eεα, e−ε(1− δ − α)} . (1)
The more intimate relationship between the two privacy definitions is that they are dual to each
other: briefly speaking, f -DP ensures (ε, δ(ε))-DP with δ(ε) = 1 + f∗(−eε) for every ε > 03.
Next, we define a single-parameter family of privacy definitions within the f -DP class for a
reason that will be apparent later. Let Gµ := T
(N (0, 1),N (µ, 1)) for µ > 0. Note that this trade-
off function admits a closed-form expression Gµ(α) = Φ(Φ
−1(1−α)−µ), where Φ is the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
Definition 2.3 ([18]). A (randomized) algorithm M is µ-Gaussian differentially private (GDP) if
T
(
M(S),M(S′)
)
> Gµ
for all neighboring datasets S and S′.
In words, µ-GDP says that determining whether any individual is in the dataset is at least
as difficult as telling apart the two normal distributions N (0, 1) and N (µ, 1) based on one draw.
The Gaussian mechanism serves as a template to achieve GDP. Consider the problem of privately
releasing a univariate statistic θ(S). The Gaussian mechanism adds N (0, σ2) noise to the statistic θ,
which gives µ-GDP if σ = sens(θ)/µ. Here the sensitivity of θ is defined as sens(θ) = supS,S′ |θ(S)−
θ(S′)|, where the supremum is over all neighboring datasets.
2.2 Properties of f-Differential Privacy
Composition. Deep learning models are trained using the composition of many SGD updates.
Broadly speaking, composition is concerned with a sequence of analyses on the same dataset where
each analysis is informed by the explorations of prior analyses. A central question that every
privacy definition is faced with is to pinpoint how the overall privacy guarantee degrades under
composition. Formally, letting M1 be the first algorithm and M2 be the second, we define their
3Here, f∗ is the convex conjugate, which is defined as f∗(x) = supα αx− f(α).
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composition algorithm M as M(S) = (M1(S),M2(S,M1(S))). Roughly speaking, the composition
is to “release all information that is learned by the algorithms.” Notably, the second algorithm M2
can take as input the output of M1 in addition to the dataset S. In general, the composition of
more than two algorithms follows recursively.
To introduce the composition theorem for f -DP, [18] defines a binary operation ⊗ on trade-off
functions. Given trade-off functions f = T (P,Q) and g = T (P ′, Q′), let f ⊗ g = T (P ×P ′, Q×Q′).
This definition depends on the distributions P,Q, P ′, Q′ only through f and g. Moreover, ⊗ is
commutative and associative. Now the composition theorem can be readily stated as follows. Let
Mt be ft-DP conditionally on any output of the prior algorithms for t = 1, . . . , T . Then their T -fold
composition algorithm is f1⊗ · · · ⊗ fT -DP. This result shows that the composition of algorithms in
the f -DP framework is reduced to performing the ⊗ operation on the associated trade-off functions.
As an important fact, the privacy bound f1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fT in general cannot be improved. Put more
precisely, one can find an ft-DP mechanism Mt for t = 1, . . . , T such that their composition is
precisely f1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fT -DP (see the discussion following Theorem 4 in [18]).
More profoundly, a central limit theorem phenomenon arises in the composition of many “very
private” f -DP algorithms in the following sense: the trade-off functions of small privacy leakage
accumulate to Gµ for some µ under composition. Informally, assuming each ft is very close to
Id(α) = 1− α, which corresponds to perfect privacy, then we have
f1 ⊗ f2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fT is approximately Gµ (2)
if the number of iterations T is sufficiently large4. This central limit theorem approximation is
especially suitable for the privacy analysis of deep learning, where the training process typically
takes at least tens of thousands of iterations. The privacy parameter µ depends on some functionals
such as the Kullback–Leibler divergence of the trade-off functions. The central limit theorem yields
a very accurate approximation in the settings considered in Section 4 (see numerical confirmation
in Appendix A). For a rigorous account of this central limit theorem for differential privacy, see
Theorem 6 in [18]. We remark that a conceptually related article [54] developed a central limit
theorem for privacy loss random variables.
At a high level, this convergence-to-GDP result brings GDP to the focal point of the family of
f -DP guarantees, implying that GDP is to f -DP as normal random variables to general random
variables. Furthermore, this result serves as an effective approximation tool for approximating the
privacy guarantees of composition algorithms. In contrast, privacy loss cannot be losslessly tracked
under composition in the (ε, δ)-DP framework.
Subsampling. In training neural networks, the gradient at each iteration is computed from a
mini-batch that is subsampled from the training examples. Intuitively, an algorithm applied to a
subsample gives stronger privacy guarantees than applied to the full sample. Looking closely, this
privacy amplification is due to the fact that an individual enjoys perfect privacy if not selected in
the subsample. A concrete and pressing question is, therefore, to precisely characterize how much
privacy is amplified by subsampling in the f -DP framework.
Consider the following sampling scheme: for each individual in the dataset S, include his or her
datum in the subsample independently with probability p, which is sometimes referred to as the
4If fi = Gµi for i = 1, . . . , T , then the T -fold composition is exactly Gµ with µ =
√∑T
i=1 µ
2
i .
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Poisson subsampling [57]. The resulting subsample is denoted by Samplep(S). For the purpose of
clearing up any confusion, we remark that the subsample Samplep(S) has a random size and as an
intermediate step is not released. Given any algorithm M , denote by M ◦ Samplep the subsampled
algorithm.
The subsampling theorem for f -DP states as follows. Let M be f -DP, write fp for pf+(1−p)Id,
and denote by f−1p the inverse5 of fp. It is proved in Appendix A that the subsampled algorithm
M ◦ Samplep satisfies
T
(
M ◦ Samplep(S),M ◦ Samplep(S′)
)
> fp (3)
if S can be obtained by removing one individual from S′. Likewise,
T
(
M ◦ Samplep(S′),M ◦ Samplep(S)
)
> f−1p .
As such, the two displays above say that the trade-off function of M ◦ Samplep on any neigh-
boring datasets is lower bounded by min{fp, f−1p }, which however is in general non-convex and
thus is not a trade-off function. This suggests that we can boost the privacy bound by replacing
min{fp, f−1p } with its double conjugate min{fp, f−1p }∗∗, which is the greatest convex lower bound
of min{fp, f−1p } and is indeed a trade-off function. Taken together, all the pieces show that the
subsampled algorithm M ◦ Samplep is min{fp, f−1p }∗∗-DP.
Notably, the privacy bound min{fp, f−1p }∗∗ is larger than f and cannot be improved in general.
In light of the above, the f -DP framework is flexible enough to nicely handle the analysis of privacy
amplification by subsampling. In the case where the original algorithm M is (ε, δ)-DP, this privacy
bound strictly improves on the subsampling theorem for (ε, δ)-DP [38].
3 Algorithms and Their Privacy Analyses
3.1 NoisySGD and NoisyAdam
SGD and Adam [33] are among the most popular optimizers in deep learning. Here we introduce
a new privacy analysis of a private variant of SGD in the f -DP framework and then extend the
study to a private version of Adam.
Letting S = {x1, . . . , xn} denote the dataset, we consider minimizing the empirical risk
L(θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θ, xi),
where θ denotes the weights of the neural networks and `(θ, xi) is a loss function. At iteration t,
a mini-batch It is selected from {1, 2, . . . , n} with subsampling probability p, thereby having an
approximate size of pn. Taking learning rate ηt and initial weights θ0, the vanilla SGD updates the
weights according to
θt+1 = θt − ηt · 1|It|
∑
i∈It
∇θ`(θt, xi).
To preserve privacy, [14, 55, 10, 3] introduce two modifications to the vanilla SGD. First, a clip step
is applied to the gradient so that the gradient is in effect bounded. This step is necessary to have a
5For any trade-off function f = T (P,Q), its inverse f−1 = T (Q,P ).
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finite sensitivity. The second modification is to add Gaussian noise to the clipped gradient, which
is equivalent to applying the Gaussian mechanism to the updated iterates. Formally, the private
SGD algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. Herein I is the identity matrix and ‖ · ‖2 denotes
the `2 norm. Formally, we present this in Algorithm 1, which we henceforth refer to as NoisySGD.
As a contribution of the present paper, NoisySGD uses the Poisson subsampling, as opposed to
the uniform sampling used in [18]. For completeness, we remark that there is another possible
subsampling method: shuffling (randomly permuting and dividing data into folds at each epoch).
We emphasize that different subsampling mechanisms produce different privacy guarantees.
Algorithm 1 NoisySGD
Input: Dataset S = {x1, . . . , xn}, loss function `(θ, x).
Parameters: initial weights θ0, learning rate ηt, subsampling probability p, number of
iterations T , noise scale σ, gradient norm bound R.
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 do
Take a Poisson subsample It ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with subsampling probability p
for i ∈ It do
v
(i)
t ← ∇θ`(θt, xi)
v¯
(i)
t ← v(i)t /max
{
1, ‖v(i)t ‖2/R
}
. Clip gradient
θt+1 ← θt − ηt · 1|It|
(∑
i∈It v¯
(i)
t + σR · N (0, I)
)
. Apply Gaussian mechanism
Output θT
The analysis of the overall privacy guarantee of NoisySGD makes heavy use of the compositional
and subsampling properties of f -DP. We first focus on the privacy analysis of the step that computes
θt+1 from θt. Let M denote the gradient update and write Samplep(S) for the mini-batch It (we
drop the subscript t for simplicity). This allows us to use M ◦ Samplep(S) to represent what
NoisySGD does at each iteration. Next, note that adding or removing one individual would change
the value of
∑
i∈It v¯
(i)
t by at most R in the `2 norm due to the clipping operation, that is,
∑
i∈It v¯
(i)
t
has sensitivity R. Consequently, the Gaussian mechanism with noise standard deviation σR ensures
that M is 1σ -GDP. With a few additional arguments, in Appendix B we show that NoisySGD is
min{f, f−1}∗∗-DP with f = (pG1/σ + (1− p)Id)⊗T . As a remark, it has been empirically observed
in [3, 6] that the performance of the private neural networks is not sensitive to the choice of the
clipping norm bound R (see more discussion in [48, 60]).
To facilitate the use of this privacy bound, we now derive an analytically tractable approximation
of min{f, f−1}∗∗ using the privacy central limit theorem in a certain asymptotic regime, which
further demonstrates the mathematical coherence and versatility of the f -DP framework. The
central limit theorem shows that, in the asymptotic regime where p
√
T → ν for a constant ν > 0
as T →∞,
f =
(
pG1/σ + (1− p)Id
)⊗T → Gµ,
where µ = ν
√
e1/σ2 − 1. Thus, the overall privacy loss in the form of the double conjugate satisfies
min{f, f−1}∗∗ ≈ min{Gµ, G−1µ }∗∗ = G∗∗µ = Gµ. (4)
As such, the central limit theorem demonstrates that NoisySGD is approximately p
√
T (e1/σ2 − 1)-
GDP. Denoting by B = pn the mini-batch size, the privacy parameter p
√
T (e1/σ2 − 1) equals
8
B
n
√
T (e1/σ2 − 1). Intuitively, this reveals that NoisySGD gives good privacy guarantees if B√T/n
is small and σ is not too small.
As an aside, we remark that this new privacy analysis is different from the one performed in
Section 5 of [18]. Therein, the authors consider Algorithm 1 with uniform subsampling and obtain
a privacy bound that is different from the one in the present paper.
Next, we present a private version of Adam [33] in Algorithm 2, which we refer to as NoisyAdam
and can be found in [2]. This algorithm has the same privacy bound as NoisySGD in the f -DP
framework. In short, this is because the momentum mt and ut are deterministic functions of the
noisy gradients and no additional privacy cost is incurred due to the post-processing property of
differential privacy. In passing, we remark that the same argument applies to AdaGrad [20] and
therefore it is also asymptotically GDP in the same asymptotic regime.
Algorithm 2 NoisyAdam
Input: Dataset S = {x1, . . . , xn}, loss function `(θ, x).
Parameters: initial weights θ0, learning rate ηt, subsampling probability p, number of
iterations T , noise scale σ, gradient norm bound R,
momentum parameters (β1, β2), initial momentum m0,
initial past squared gradient u0, and a small constant ξ > 0.
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 do
Take a Poisson subsample It ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with subsample probability p
for i ∈ It do
v
(i)
t ← ∇θ`(θt, xi)
v¯
(i)
t ← v(i)t /max
{
1, ‖v(i)t ‖2/R
}
. Clip gradient
v˜t ← 1|It|
(∑
i∈It v¯
(i)
t + σR · N (0, I)
)
. Apply Gaussian mechanism
mt ← β1mt−1 + (1− β1)v˜t
ut ← β2ut−1 + (1− β2)
(
v˜t  v˜t
)
.  is the Hadamard product
wt ← mt/
(√
ut + ξ
)
. Component-wise division
θt+1 ← θt − ηtwt
Output θT
3.2 Comparisons with the Moments Accountant
It is instructive to compare the moments accountant with our privacy analysis performed in Sec-
tion 3.1 using the f -DP framework. Developed in [3], the moments accountant gives a tight one-
to-one mapping between ε and δ for specifying the overall privacy loss in terms of (ε, δ)-DP under
composition, which is beyond the reach of the advanced composition theorem [24]. In slightly more
detail, the moments accountant uses the moment generating function of the privacy loss random
variable to track the privacy loss under composition. As abuse of notation, this paper uses functions
δMA = δMA(ε) and εMA = εMA(δ) to denote the mapping induced by the moments accountant in both
directions6. For self-containedness, the appendix includes a formal description of the two functions.
Although NoisySGD and NoisyAdam are our primary focus, our following discussion applies to
general iterative algorithms where composition must be addressed in the privacy analysis. Let
6We omit the dependence of the functions on the specification of the composition algorithm such as p, σ, T as in
NoisySGD and NoisyAdam.
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algorithm Mt be ft-DP for t = 1, . . . , T and write M for their composition. On the one hand, the
moments accountant technique ensures that M is (ε, δMA(ε))-DP for any ε or, put equivalently, is
(εMA, δ)-DP
7. On the other hand, the composition algorithm is f1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fT -DP from the f -DP
viewpoint and, following from the central limit theorem (2), this composition can be shown to be
approximately GDP in a certain asymptotic regime. For example, both NoisySGD and NoisyAdam
presented in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, respectively, asymptotically satisfy µCLT-GDP with
privacy parameter
µCLT = p
√
T (e1/σ2 − 1). (5)
In light of the above, it is tempting to ask which of the two approaches yields a sharper privacy
analysis. In terms of f -DP guarantees, it must be the latter, which we refer to as the CLT approach,
because the composition theorem of f -DP is tight and, more importantly, the privacy central limit
theorem is asymptotic exact. To formally state the result, note that the moments accountant asserts
that the private optimizer is (ε, δMA(ε))-DP for all ε > 0, which is equivalent to supε>0 fε,δMA(ε)-DP
by recognizing (1) (see also Proposition 2.11 in [18]). Roughly speaking, the following theorem says
that supε>0 fε,δMA(ε)-DP (asymptotically) promises no more privacy guarantees than the bound of
µCLT-GDP given by the CLT approach. This simple result is summarized by the following theorem
and see Appendix B for a formal proof of this result.
Theorem 1 (Comparison in f -DP). Assume that p
√
T converges to a positive constant as T →∞.
Then, both NoisySGD and NoisyAdam satisfy
lim sup
T→∞
(
sup
ε>0
fε,δMA(ε)(α)−GµCLT(α)
)
6 0
for every 0 6 α 6 1.
Remark 1. For ease of reading, we point out that, in the (ε, δ)-DP framework, the smaller ε, δ are,
the more privacy is guaranteed. In contrast, in the f -DP framework, the smaller f is, the less
privacy is guaranteed.
From the (ε, δ)-DP viewpoint, however, the question is presently unclear. Explicitly, the duality
between f -DP and (ε, δ)-DP shows that µ-GDP implies (ε, δ(ε;µ))-DP for all ε > 0, where8
δ(ε;µ) = 1 +G∗µ(−eε) = Φ(−
ε
µ
+
µ
2
)− eεΦ(− ε
µ
− µ
2
). (6)
The question is, therefore, reduced to the comparison between δMA(ε) and δCLT(ε) := δ(ε;µCLT) or,
equivalently, between εMA(δ) and εCLT(δ) := ε(δ;µCLT)
9.
Theorem 2 (Comparison in (ε, δ)-DP). Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the f -DP frame-
work gives an asymptotically sharper privacy analysis of both NoisySGD and NoisyAdam than the
moments accountant in terms of (ε, δ)-DP. That is,
lim sup
T→∞
(δCLT(ε)− δMA(ε)) < 0
for all ε > 0.
7The moments accountant can be applied in the f -DP framework. In fact, the moments accountant is defined
via a certain moment generating function, which is equivalent to the Re´nyi divergence. The Re´nyi divergence can be
uniquely deduced from a trade-off function. See Section 2.3 in [18].
8See Section 2.4 of [18] for this result. See also [25, 7].
9Here, ε(δ;µ) is the inverse function of δ(ε;µ).
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In words, the CLT approach in the f -DP framework allows for an asymptotically smaller δ than
the moments accountant at the same ε. It is worthwhile mentioning that the inequality in this
theorem holds for any finite T if δ is derived by directly applying the duality to the (exact) privacy
bound f1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fT . Equivalently, the theorem says that lim supT→∞ (εCLT(δ)− εMA(δ)) < 0 for
any δ10. As such, by setting the same δ in both approaches, say δ = 10−5, the f -DP based CLT
approach shall give a smaller value of ε.
From a practical viewpoint, this refined privacy analysis allows us to trade privacy guarantees for
improvement in utility. More precisely, recognizing the aforementioned conclusion that δ(ε;µCLT) ≡
δCLT(ε) < δMA(ε) (for sufficiently large T ) and that δ(ε;µ) increases as µ increases, one can find
µ˜CLT > µCLT such that
δ(ε; µ˜CLT) = δMA(ε). (7)
Put differently, we can carefully adjust some parameters in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 in order
to let the algorithms be µ˜CLT-GDP. For example, we can reduce the scale of the added noise from
σ to a certain σ˜ < σ, which can be solved from (7) and
µ˜CLT = p
√
T (e1/σ˜2 − 1). (8)
Note that this is adapted from (5).
NoisyOptimizer(σ, · · · ) (ε, δMA(ε))-DP
µCLT-GDP
(
ε, δCLT(ε)
)
-DP δMA(ε) > δCLT(ε)
µ˜CLT-GDP
NoisyOptimizer(σ˜, · · · )σ > σ˜
CLT
Dual
MA Dual
CLT
(7)
(8)
Figure 1: An illustration of the CLT approach in the f -DP framework and the moments accountant
in the (ε, δ)-DP framework. NoisyOptimizer(σ, . . . ) using the moments accountant gives the same
privacy guarantees in terms of (ε, δ)-DP as NoisyOptimizer(σ˜, . . . ) using the CLT approach (the
ellipses denote omitted parameters). Note that the duality formula (6) is used in solving µ˜CLT from
(7).
Figure 1 shows the flowchart of the privacy analyses using the two approaches and their rela-
tionship. In addition, numerical comparisons are presented in Figure 2, consistently demonstrating
the superiority of the CLT approach.
10Write δ?CLT = δCLT(0) and set εCLT(δ) = 0 for δ > δ?CLT. Apply the same adjustment for εMA.
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Figure 2: Tradeoffs between ε and δ for both CLT and MA, which henceforth denotes the moments
accountant. The settings follows the MNIST experiment in Section 4 with σ = 0.7, p = 256/60000.
The bottom two plots assume δ = 10−5. Note ε and δ in the CLT are related via (6) with µ = µCLT.
The bottom right plot is consistent with the conclusion σ > σ˜ shown in the cloud icon of Figure 1.
4 Results
In this section, we use NoisySGD and NoisyAdam to train private deep learning models on datasets
for tasks ranging from image classification (MNIST), text classification (IMDb movie review),
recommender systems (MovieLens movie rating), to regular binary classification (Adult income).
Note that these datasets all contain sensitive information about individuals, and this fact neces-
sitates privacy consideration in the training process. Code to reproduce the results using the
TensorFlow Privacy library is available at https://github.com/tensorflow/privacy/tree/
master/research/GDP_2019.
4.1 The f-DP Perspective
This section demonstrates the utility and practicality of the private deep learning methodologies
with associated privacy guarantees in terms of f -DP. In Section 4.2, we extend the empirical study
to the (ε, δ)-DP framework. Throughout the experiments, the parameter δ we use always satisfies
δ < 1/n, where n is the number of training examples.
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MNIST. The MNIST dataset [35] contains 60,000 training images and 10,000 test images. Each
image is in 28 × 28 gray-scale representing a handwritten digit ranging from 0 to 9. We train
neural networks with the same architecture (two convolutional layers followed by one dense layer)
as in [2, 3] on this dataset. Throughout the experiment, we set the subsampling probability to
p = 256/60000 and use a constant learning rate η.
η R σ Epochs Test accuracy (%) CLT µ CLT ε MA ε
0.25 1.5 1.3 15 95.0 0.23 0.83 1.19
0.15 1.0 1.1 60 96.6 0.57 2.32 3.01
0.25 1.5 0.7 45 97.0 1.13 5.07 7.10
0.25 1.5 0.6 62 97.6 2.00 9.98 13.27
0.25 1.5 0.55 68 97.8 2.76 14.98 18.72
0.25 1.5 0.5 100 98.0 4.78 31.12 32.40
Table 1: Experimental results for NoisySGD and their privacy analyses on MNIST. The accuracy
is averaged over 10 independent runs. The hyperparameters in the first three rows are the same as
in [2]. The µ in the 6th row is calculated using (5), which carries over to the 7th row via (6) with
δ = 10−5. The number of epochs is equal to T ×mini-batch size/n = pT .
Table 1 displays the test accuracy of the neural networks trained by NoisySGD as well as the
associated privacy analyses. The privacy parameters ε in the last two columns are both with
respect to δ = 10−5. Over all six sets of experiments with different tuning parameters, the CLT
approach gives a significantly smaller value of ε than the moments accountant, which is consistent
with our discussion in Section 3.2. The point we wish to emphasize, however, is that f -DP offers
a much more comprehensive interpretation of the privacy guarantees than (ε, δ)-DP. For instance,
the model from the third row preserves a decent amount of privacy since it is not always easy to
tell apart N (0, 1) and N (1.13, 1). In stark contrast, the (ε, δ)-DP viewpoint is too conservative,
suggesting that for the same model not much privacy is left, due to a very large “likelihood ratio” eε
in Definition 2.1: it equals e7.10 = 1212.0 or e5.07 = 159.1 depending on which approach is chosen.
This shortcoming of (ε, δ)-DP cannot be overcome by taking a larger δ, which, although gives rise
to a smaller ε, would undermine the privacy guarantee from a different perspective.
For all experiments described in Table 1, Figure 3 illustrates the privacy bounds given by the
CLT approach and the moments accountant both in terms of trade-off functions. The six plots in
the first and third rows are with respect to δ = 10−5, from which the f -DP framework is seen to
provide an analyst with substantial improvements in the privacy bounds. Note that the first row in
Figure 3 corresponds to the first three rows in Table 1, and the third row in Figure 3 corresponds to
the last three rows in Table 1. For the model corresponding to 96.6% test accuracy, concretely, the
minimum sum of type I and type II errors in the sense of hypothesis testing is (at least) 77.6% by the
CLT approach, whereas it is merely (at least) 9.4% by the moments accountant. For completeness,
we show the optimal trade-off functions over all pairs of ε, δ given by the moments accountant
in the middle row. The gaps between the two approaches exist, as predicted by Theorem 1, and
remain significant.
Next, we extend our experiments to other datasets to further test f -DP for training private
neural networks. The experiments compare private models under the privacy budget µ ≤ 2 to their
non-private counterparts and some popular baseline methods. For simplicity, we focus on shallow
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Figure 3: Comparisons between the two ways of privacy analysis on MNIST in terms of the trade-
off between type I and type II errors, in the same setting as Table 1. The plots are different from
Figure 7 in [18]. The (ε, δ)-DP guarantees are plotted according to (1). The blue regions in the
plots from the second row correspond to all pairs of (ε, δ) computed by MA. The blue regions are
not noticeable in the third row.
neural networks and leave the investigation of complex architectures for future research.
Adult income. Originally from the UCI repository [19], the Adult income dataset has been
preprocessed into the LIBSVM format [13]. This dataset contains 32,561 examples, each of which
has 123 features and a label indicating whether the individual’s annual income is more than $50,000
or not. We randomly choose 10% of the examples as the test set (3,256 examples) and use the
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remaining 29,305 examples as the training set.
Our model is a single-layer multi-perceptron with 16 neurons and the ReLU activation. We
set σ = 0.55, p = 256/29305, η = 0.15, R = 1, and use NoisySGD as our optimizer. The results
displayed in Table 2 show that our private model achieves comparable performance to the baselines
in the MLC++ library [34] in terms of test accuracy.
Models Epochs Test accuracy (%) CLT µ CLT ε MA ε
private networks 18 84.0 2.03 10.20 14.70
non-private networks 20 84.5 — — —
kNN [15] — 79.7 — — —
naive Bayes — 83.9 — — —
voted ID3 [49] — 84.4 — — —
C4.5 [50] — 84.5 — — —
Table 2: Results for NoisySGD on the Adult income dataset. The ε parameters are with respect to
δ = 10−5.
IMDb. We use the IMDb movie review dataset [40] for binary sentiment classification (positive
or negative reviews). The dataset contains 25,000 training and 25,000 test examples. In our
experiments, we prepocess the dataset by only including the top 10,000 frequently used words and
discard the rest. Next, we set every example to have 256 words by truncating the length or filling
with zeros if necessary.
In our neural networks, the input is first embedded into 16 units and then is passed through a
global average pooling. The intermediate output is fed to a fully-connected layer with 16 neurons,
followed by a ReLU layer. We set σ = 0.56, p = 512/25000, η = 0.02, R = 1, and use NoisyAdam
as our optimizer, which is observed to converge much faster than NoisySGD in this training task.
We use the (non-private) two-layer LSTM RNN model in the Tensorflow tutorials [1] as a baseline
model. Table 3 reports the experimental results. Notably, the private neural networks perform
comparably to the baseline model, at the cost of only one percent drop in test accuracy compared
to the non-private counterpart.
Models Epochs Test accuracy (%) CLT µ CLT ε MA ε
private networks 9 83.8 2.07 10.43 15.24
non-private networks 20 84.7 — — —
LSTM-RNN [30] 10 85.4 — — —
Table 3: Results for NoisyAdam on the IMDB dataset, with δ = 10−5 used in the privacy analyses.
MovieLens. The MovieLens movie rating dataset [28] is a benchmark dataset for recommenda-
tion tasks. Our experiments consider the MovieLens 1M dataset, which contains 1,000,209 movie
ratings from 1 star to 5 stars. In total, there are 6,040 users who rated 3,706 different movies.
For this multi-class classification problem, the root mean squared error (RMSE) is chosen as the
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performance measure. It is worthwhile to mention that, as each user only watched a small fraction
of all the movies, most (user, movie) pairs correspond to missing ratings. We randomly sample
20% of the examples as the test set and take the remainder as the training set.
Our model is a simplified version of the neural collaborative filtering in [29]. The network
architecture consists of two branches. The left branch applies generalized matrix factorization
to embed the users and movies using five latent factors. The output of the user embedding is
multiplied by the item embedding. In the right branch, we use 10 latent factors for embedding.
The embedding from both branches are then concatenated, which is fed to a fully-connected output
layer. We set σ = 0.6, p = 1/80, η = 0.01, and R = 5 in NoisyAdam.
Models Epochs RMSE CLT µ CLT ε MA ε
private networks 20 0.915 1.94 10.61 15.39
non-private networks 20 0.893 — — —
SVD — 0.873 — — —
NMF — 0.916 — — —
user-based CF [52] — 0.923 — — —
global average — 1.117 — — —
Table 4: Results for NoisyAdam on the MovieLens 1M dataset, with δ = 10−6 used in the privacy
analyses. CF stands for collaborative filtering.
Table 4 presents the numerical results of our neural networks as well as baseline models in
the Suprise library [31] in their default settings. The difference in RMSE between the non-private
networks and the private one is relatively large for the MovieLens 1M dataset. Nevertheless,
the private model still outperforms many popular non-private models, including the user-based
collaborative filtering and nonnegative matrix factorization.
4.2 The (ε, δ)-DP Perspective
While we hope that the f -DP perspective has been conclusively demonstrated to be advanta-
geous, this section shows that the CLT approach continues to bring considerable benefits even in
terms of (ε, δ)-DP. Specifically, by making use of the comparisons between the CLT approach and
the moments accountant in Section 3.2, we can add less noise to the gradients in NoisySGD and
NoisyAdam while achieving the same (ε, δ)-DP guarantees provided by the moments accountant.
With less added noise, conceivably, an optimizer would have a higher prediction accuracy.
Figure 4 illustrates the experimental results on MNIST. In the top two plots, we set the noise
scales to σ = 1.3, σ˜ = 1.06, which are both shown to give (1.34, 10−5)-DP at epoch 20 using the
moments accountant and the CLT approach, respectively. The test accuracy associated with the CLT
approach is almost always higher than that associated with the moments accountant. In addition,
another benefit of taking the CLT approach is that it gives rise to stronger privacy protection before
reaching epoch 20, as shown by the right plot. For the bottom plots, although the improvement
in test accuracy at the end of training is less significant, the CLT approach leads to much faster
convergence at early epochs. To be concrete, the numbers of epochs needed to achieve 95%, 96%,
and 97% test accuracy are 18, 26, and 45, respectively, for the neural networks with less noise,
whereas the numbers of epochs are 23, 33, and 64, respectively, using noise level that is computed
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by the moments accountant. In a similar vein, the moments accountant gives a test accuracy of
92% for the first time when ε = 4 and the CLT approach achieves 96% under the same privacy
budget.
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Figure 4: Experimental results from one run of NoisySGD on MNIST with different noise scales
but the same (ε, δ)-DP guarantees. The top plots use p = 256/60000, η = 0.15, R = 1.5, and
σ = 1.3, σ˜ = 1.06. The CLT approach with σ˜ = 1.06 and the moments accountant with σ = 1.3
give (1.34, 10−5)-DP at the 20th epoch (µCLT = 0.35). The bottom plots use the same parameters
except for σ = 0.7, σ˜ = 0.638, and η = 0.15. Both approaches give (8.68, 10−5)-DP at epoch 70
(µCLT = 1.78). The right plots show the privacy loss during the training process in terms of the ε
spending with respect to δ = 10−5.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we have showcased the use of f -DP, a very recently proposed privacy definition,
for training private deep learning models using SGD or Adam. Owing to its strength in handling
composition and subsampling and the powerful privacy central limit theorem, the f -DP framework
allows for a closed-form privacy bound that is sharper than the one given by the moments accountant
in the (ε, δ)-DP framework. By numerical experiments, we show that the trained neural networks
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can be quite private from the f -DP viewpoint (for instance, 1.13-GDP11) but are not in the (ε, δ)-
DP sense due to over conservative privacy bounds (for instance, (7.10, 10−5)-DP) computed in the
(ε, δ)-DP framework. This in turn suggests that one can add less noise during the training process
while having the same privacy guarantees as using the moments accountant, thereby improving
model utility.
We conclude this paper by offering several directions for future research. As the first direction,
we may consider using time-dependent noise scales and learning rates in NoisySGD and NoisyAdam
for a better tradeoff between privacy loss and utility in the f -DP framework. Note that [37] has
made considerable progress using concentrated differential privacy along this line. More generally,
a straightforward but interesting problem is to extend this work to complex neural network archi-
tectures with a variety of optimization strategies. For example, can we develop some guidelines for
choosing an optimizer among NoisySGD, NoisyAdam, and others for a given classification problem
under some privacy constraint? Empirically, deep learning models are very sensitive to hyperpa-
rameters such as mini-batch size in terms of test accuracy. Therefore, from a practical standpoint, it
would be of great importance to incorporate hyperparameter tuning into the f -DP framework [27].
Inspired by [36], another interesting direction is to explore the possible relationship between f -DP
guarantees and adversarial robustness of neural networks. Given f -DP’s good interpretability and
powerful toolbox, it is worthwhile investigating whether, from a broad perspective, its superiority
over earlier differential privacy relaxations would hold in general private statistical and machine
learning tasks. We look forward to more research efforts to further the theory and extend the use
of f -DP.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to David Durfee, Ryan Rogers, Aaron Roth, and Qinqing Zheng for stimulating
discussions in the early stages of this work. We would also like to thank two anonymous referees for
their constructive comments that improved the presentation of the paper. This work was supported
in part by NSF through CAREER DMS-1847415, CCF-1763314, and CCF-1934876, the Wharton
Dean’s Research Fund, and NIH through R01GM124111 and RF1AG063481.
References
[1] IMDB Tensorflow RNN tutorial.
www.tensorflow.org/tutorials/text/text_classification_rnn.
[2] Tensorflow Privacy library.
github.com/tensorflow/privacy.
[3] M. Abadi, A. Chu, I. Goodfellow, H. B. McMahan, I. Mironov, K. Talwar, and L. Zhang. Deep
learning with differential privacy. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, pages 308–318. ACM, 2016.
[4] J. M. Abowd. The US Census Bureau adopts differential privacy. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM
SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining, pages 2867–2867. ACM,
2018.
11This means that undermining the privacy guarantee is harder than or of the same hardness as testing H0 : µ = 0
against H1 : µ = 1.13 based on the observation µ+N (0, 1).
18
[5] D. P. T. Apple. Learning with privacy at scale. Technical report, Apple, 2017.
[6] E. Bagdasaryan, O. Poursaeed, and V. Shmatikov. Differential privacy has disparate impact on model
accuracy. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 15453–15462, 2019.
[7] B. Balle and Y.-X. Wang. Improving the gaussian mechanism for differential privacy: Analytical cal-
ibration and optimal denoising. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 403–412,
2018.
[8] B. Balle, G. Barthe, and M. Gaboardi. Privacy amplification by subsampling: Tight analyses via
couplings and divergences. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 6280–6290,
2018.
[9] B. Balle, G. Barthe, M. Gaboardi, J. Hsu, and T. Sato. Hypothesis testing interpretations and renyi
differential privacy. arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.09982, 2019.
[10] R. Bassily, A. Smith, and A. Thakurta. Private empirical risk minimization: Efficient algorithms and
tight error bounds. In 2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages
464–473. IEEE, 2014.
[11] M. Bun and T. Steinke. Concentrated differential privacy: Simplifications, extensions, and lower bounds.
In Theory of Cryptography Conference, pages 635–658. Springer, 2016.
[12] M. Bun, C. Dwork, G. N. Rothblum, and T. Steinke. Composable and versatile privacy via truncated
cdp. In Proceedings of the 50th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages
74–86. ACM, 2018.
[13] C.-C. Chang and C.-J. Lin. Libsvm: A library for support vector machines. ACM Transactions on
Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST), 2(3):27, 2011.
[14] K. Chaudhuri, C. Monteleoni, and A. D. Sarwate. Differentially private empirical risk minimization.
Journal of Machine Learning Research, 12(Mar):1069–1109, 2011.
[15] T. Cover and P. Hart. Nearest neighbor pattern classification. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, 13(1):21–27, 1967.
[16] B. Ding, J. Kulkarni, and S. Yekhanin. Collecting telemetry data privately. In Proceedings of Advances
in Neural Information Processing Systems 30 (NIPS 2017), 2017.
[17] J. Dong, D. Durfee, and R. Rogers. Optimal differential privacy composition for exponential mechanisms
and the cost of adaptivity. arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.13830, 2019.
[18] J. Dong, A. Roth, and W. J. Su. Gaussian differential privacy. arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.02383, 2019.
[19] D. Dua and C. Graff. UCI machine learning repository, 2017. URL http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml.
[20] J. Duchi, E. Hazan, and Y. Singer. Adaptive subgradient methods for online learning and stochastic
optimization. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 12(Jul):2121–2159, 2011.
[21] C. Dwork and G. N. Rothblum. Concentrated differential privacy. arXiv preprint arXiv:1603.01887,
2016.
[22] C. Dwork, K. Kenthapadi, F. McSherry, I. Mironov, and M. Naor. Our data, ourselves: Privacy via
distributed noise generation. In Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques, pages 486–503. Springer, 2006.
19
[23] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith. Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data
analysis. In Theory of cryptography conference, pages 265–284. Springer, 2006.
[24] C. Dwork, G. N. Rothblum, and S. Vadhan. Boosting and differential privacy. In Foundations of
Computer Science (FOCS), 2010 51st Annual IEEE Symposium on, pages 51–60. IEEE, 2010.
[25] C. Dwork, K. Talwar, A. Thakurta, and L. Zhang. Analyze gauss: optimal bounds for privacy-preserving
principal component analysis. In Proceedings of the forty-sixth annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, pages 11–20. ACM, 2014.
[26] U´. Erlingsson, V. Pihur, and A. Korolova. Rappor: Randomized aggregatable privacy-preserving ordinal
response. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 1054–1067. ACM, 2014.
[27] A. Gupta, K. Ligett, F. McSherry, A. Roth, and K. Talwar. Differentially private combinatorial op-
timization. In Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms,
pages 1106–1125. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2010.
[28] F. M. Harper and J. A. Konstan. The movielens datasets: History and context. Acm Transactions on
Interactive Intelligent Systems (TIIS), 5(4):19, 2016.
[29] X. He, L. Liao, H. Zhang, L. Nie, X. Hu, and T.-S. Chua. Neural collaborative filtering. In Proceedings
of the 26th International Conference on World Wide Web, pages 173–182. International World Wide
Web Conferences Steering Committee, 2017.
[30] S. Hochreiter and J. Schmidhuber. Long short-term memory. Neural Computation, 9(8):1735–1780,
1997.
[31] N. Hug. Surprise, a Python library for recommender systems. http://surpriselib.com, 2017.
[32] P. Kairouz, S. Oh, and P. Viswanath. The composition theorem for differential privacy. IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Theory, 63(6):4037–4049, 2017.
[33] D. P. Kingma and J. Ba. Adam: A method for stochastic optimization. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6980,
2014.
[34] R. Kohavi, D. Sommerfield, and J. Dougherty. Data mining using/spl mscr//spl lscr//spl cscr/++ a
machine learning library in c++. In Proceedings Eighth IEEE International Conference on Tools with
Artificial Intelligence, pages 234–245. IEEE, 1996.
[35] Y. LeCun and C. Cortes. MNIST handwritten digit database. 2010. URL http://yann.lecun.com/
exdb/mnist/.
[36] M. Lecuyer, V. Atlidakis, R. Geambasu, D. Hsu, and S. Jana. Certified robustness to adversarial
examples with differential privacy. In 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages
656–672. IEEE, 2019.
[37] J. Lee and D. Kifer. Concentrated differentially private gradient descent with adaptive per-iteration
privacy budget. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery & Data Mining, pages 1656–1665. ACM, 2018.
[38] N. Li, W. Qardaji, and D. Su. On sampling, anonymization, and differential privacy or, k-anonymization
meets differential privacy. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and
Communications Security, pages 32–33. ACM, 2012.
20
[39] C. Liu, X. He, T. Chanyaswad, S. Wang, and P. Mittal. Investigating statistical privacy frameworks
from the perspective of hypothesis testing. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2019(3):
233–254, 2019.
[40] A. L. Maas, R. E. Daly, P. T. Pham, D. Huang, A. Y. Ng, and C. Potts. Learning word vectors for
sentiment analysis. In Proceedings of the 49th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational
Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, pages 142–150. Association for Computational Linguistics,
2011.
[41] B. McMahan, G. Andrew, I. Mironov, N. Papernot, P. Kairouz, S. Chien, and U´. Erlingsson. A
general approach to adding differential privacy to iterative training procedures. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1812.06210, 2018.
[42] H. B. McMahan, D. Ramage, K. Talwar, and L. Zhang. Learning differentially private recurrent language
models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.06963, 2017.
[43] I. Mironov. Re´nyi differential privacy. In 2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
(CSF), pages 263–275. IEEE, 2017.
[44] J. Murtagh and S. Vadhan. The complexity of computing the optimal composition of differential privacy.
In Theory of Cryptography Conference, pages 157–175. Springer, 2016.
[45] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov. Robust de-anonymization of large sparse datasets. In 2008 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 111–125. IEEE, 2008.
[46] N. Papernot, M. Abadi, U. Erlingsson, I. Goodfellow, and K. Talwar. Semi-supervised knowledge
transfer for deep learning from private training data. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.05755, 2016.
[47] N. Papernot, S. Song, I. Mironov, A. Raghunathan, K. Talwar, and U´. Erlingsson. Scalable private
learning with pate. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.08908, 2018.
[48] V. Pichapati, A. T. Suresh, F. X. Yu, S. J. Reddi, and S. Kumar. AdaCliP: Adaptive clipping for
private SGD. arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.07643, 2019.
[49] J. R. Quinlan. Induction of decision trees. Machine learning, 1(1):81–106, 1986.
[50] J. R. Quinlan. C4. 5: programs for machine learning. Elsevier, 2014.
[51] R. T. Rockafellar. Convex analysis, volume 28. Princeton University Press, 1970.
[52] B. M. Sarwar, G. Karypis, J. A. Konstan, J. Riedl, et al. Item-based collaborative filtering recommen-
dation algorithms. Www, 1:285–295, 2001.
[53] R. Shokri and V. Shmatikov. Privacy-preserving deep learning. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM
SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security, pages 1310–1321. ACM, 2015.
[54] D. Sommer, S. Meiser, and E. Mohammadi. Privacy loss classes: The central limit theorem in differential
privacy. 2018.
[55] S. Song, K. Chaudhuri, and A. D. Sarwate. Stochastic gradient descent with differentially private
updates. In 2013 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, pages 245–248. IEEE,
2013.
[56] L. Sweeney. Weaving technology and policy together to maintain confidentiality. The Journal of Law,
Medicine & Ethics, 25(2-3):98–110, 1997.
21
[57] Y.-X. Wang, B. Balle, and S. P. Kasiviswanathan. Subsampled Renyi differential privacy and analytical
moments accountant. In The 22nd International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics,
pages 1226–1235, 2019.
[58] L. Wasserman and S. Zhou. A statistical framework for differential privacy. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 105(489):375–389, 2010.
[59] L. Xiang, J. Yang, and B. Li. Differentially-private deep learning from an optimization perspective. In
IEEE INFOCOM 2019-IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, pages 559–567. IEEE, 2019.
[60] Z. Xu, S. Shi, A. X. Liu, J. Zhao, and L. Chen. An adaptive and fast convergent approach to differentially
private deep learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.09150, 2019.
[61] J. Zhang, K. Zheng, W. Mou, and L. Wang. Efficient private ERM for smooth objectives. In Proceedings
of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 3922–3928. AAAI Press, 2017.
22
A Omitted Details in Section 2
We present Equation (3) as the following proposition, which is given in Section 2 but not in the
foundational work [18].
Proposition A.1. If M is f -DP, and S′ = S ∪ {x0}, then
T
(
M ◦ Samplep(S),M ◦ Samplep(S′)
)
> pf + (1− p)Id.
Proof. We first write the two distributions M ◦ Samplep(S) and M ◦ Samplep(S′) as mixtures.
Without loss of generality, we can assume S = {x1, . . . , xn} and S′ = {x0, x1, . . . , xn}. An
outcome of the process Samplep when applied to S is a bit string
~b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ {0, 1}n. Bit bi
dependes on whether xi is selected into the subsample. We use S~b ⊆ S to denote the subsample
determined by ~b. When each bi is sampled from a Bernoulli(p) distribution independently, S~b can
be identified with Samplep(S). Let θ~b be the probability that
~b appears. More specifically, if k out
of n entries of ~b is one, then θ~b = p
k(1− p)n−k. With this notation, M ◦ Samplep(S) can be written
as the following mixture:
M ◦ Samplep(S) =
∑
~b∈{0,1}n
θ~b ·M(S~b).
Similarly, M ◦ Samplep(S) can also be written as a mixture, with an additional bit indicating the
presence of x0. Alternatively, we can divide the components into two groups: one with x0 present,
and the other with x0 absent. Namely,
M ◦ Samplep(S′) =
∑
~b∈{0,1}n
p · θ~b ·M(S~b ∪ {x0}) +
∑
~b∈{0,1}n
(1− p) · θ~b ·M(S~b).
Note that S~b ∪ {x0} and S~b are neighbors, i.e. M ◦ Samplep(S′) is the mixture of neighboring
distributions. The following lemma is the perfect tool to deal with it.
Lemma A.2. Let I be an index set. For all i ∈ I, Pi and Qi are distributions that reside on a
common sample space. (θi)i∈I is a collection of non-negative numbers that sums to 1. If f is a
trade-off function and T (Pi, Qi) > f for all i, then
T
(∑
θiPi, (1− p)
∑
θiPi + p
∑
θiQi
)
> pf + (1− p)Id.
To apply the lemma, let the index be ~b ∈ {0, 1}n, Pi be M(S~b) and Qi be M(S~b ∪ {x0}).
Condition T (Pi, Qi) > f is the consequence of M being f -DP. The conclusion simply translates to
T
(
M ◦ Samplep(S),M ◦ Samplep(S′)
)
> pf + (1− p)Id,
which is what we want. The proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Let P =
∑
θiPi and Q = (1 − p)
∑
θiPi + p
∑
θiQi. Suppose φ satisfies
EPφ = α. That is, ∑
θiEPiφ = α.
It is easy to see that
EQφ = (1− p)α+ p
∑
θiEQiφ.
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We know that T (Pi, Qi) > f . Hence EQiφ 6 1− f(EPiφ). So∑
θiEQiφ 6 1−
∑
θif(EPiφ).
Since f is convex, Jensen’s inequality implies∑
θif(EPiφ) > f(
∑
θiEPiφ) = f(α).
Next we use a figure to justify the claim we made in Section 2.2 that “CLT approximation works
well for SGD”. Recall that we argued in Section 3 that Algorithms 1 and 2 are min{f, f−1}∗∗-DP
where
f =
(
pG1/σ + (1− p)Id
)⊗T
.
This function converges to Gµ with µ = ν
√
e1/σ2 − 1 as T → ∞ provided p√T → ν. In the
following figure, we numerically compute f (blue dashed) and compare it with the predicted limit
Gµ (red solid). More specifically, the configuration is designed to illustrate the fast convergence in
the setting of the second line of Table 1, i.e. noise scale σ = 1.1, final GDP parameter µ = 0.57
and test accuracy 96.6%. Originally the algorithm runs 60 epochs, i.e. ≈ 14k iterations. To best
illustrate that convergence appears in early stage, the numerical evaluation uses a much smaller
Tnumeric = 234, i.e. only one epoch. In order to make the final limit consistent, we also enlarge the
sample probability to pnumeric so that pnumeric ·
√
Tnumeric remain the same.
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Figure 5:
(
pG1/σ + (1 − p)Id
)⊗T
(blue dashed) is numerically computed and compared with the
GDP limit (red solid) predicted by CLT. The two are almost identical at merely epoch one.
We have to remark that when σ is small, µ = ν
√
e1/σ2 − 1 gets large and yields challenges in
the numerical computation of
(
pG1/σ + (1 − p)Id
)⊗T
. We leave rigorous and complete study to
future work.
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B Omitted Details in Section 3
B.1 Privacy Property of Algorithms 1 and 2
Theorem 3. Algorithms 1 and 2 are both min{f, f−1}∗∗-DP with f = (pG1/σ + (1− p)Id)⊗T .
Proof. The proof is mostly done in the main text, except the composition step. Let V be the vector
space that all θt live in and M˜ = M ◦ Samplep : Xn × V → V be the gradient update. We have
already proved (using Proposition A.1) that for both Algorithms 1 and 2, if S′ = S ∪{x0}, then M˜
satisfies
T
(
M(S),M(S′)
)
> fp := pG1/σ + (1− p)Id.
Note that we cannot say M is fp-DP because T
(
M(S′),M(S)
)
is not necessarily lower bounded by
fp. So we need a more specific composition theorem than stated in [18].
Theorem 4 (Refined Composition). Suppose M1 : X → Y,M2 : X × Y → Z satisfy the following
conditions for any S, S′ such that S′ = S ∪ {x0}:
1. T
(
M1(S),M(S
′)
)
> f ;
2. T
(
M2(S, y),M2(S
′, y)
)
> g for any y ∈ Y .
Then the composition M2 ◦M1 : X → Y × Z satisfies
T
(
M2 ◦M1(S),M2 ◦M1(S′)
)
> f ⊗ g
for any S, S′ such that S′ = S ∪ {x0}.
The theorem can be identically proved as Theorem 3.2 in [18].
Taking Algorithm 1 as an example, since
NoisySGD : Xn → V × V × · · · × V
S 7→ (θ1, θ2, . . . , θT )
is simply the composition of T copies of M˜ , the above composition theorem implies that
T
(
NoisySGD(S), NoisySGD(S′)
)
>
(
pG1/σ + (1− p)Id
)⊗T
= f.
Moreover, T
(
NoisySGD(S), NoisySGD(S′)
)
> f−1. The two inequality let us conclude that any
trade-off function of neighboring distributions must be lower bounded by at least one of f and f−1,
hence min{f, f−1}, hence min{f, f−1}∗∗. In other words, NoisySGD is min{f, f−1}∗∗-DP.
For NoisyAdam, we argued that its privacy property is the same as NoisySGD in each iteration,
so the above argument also applies, and we have the same conclusion.
B.2 Justifying CLT for Algorithms 1 and 2
The main purpose of this section is to show the following theorem
Theorem 5. Suppose p depends on T and p
√
T → ν. Then we have the following uniform conver-
gence as T →∞ (
pG1/σ + (1− p)Id
)⊗T
= Gµ,
where µ = ν ·
√
T (e1/σ2 − 1).
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This theorem is the corollary of the following more general CLT on composition of subsample
mechanisms and Lemma B.1 below.
Theorem 6. Suppose f is a trade-off function such that (1) f(0) = 1, (2) f(x) > 0, for all x < 1
and (3)
∫ 1
0 (f
′(x) + 1)4 dx < +∞. Let fp = pf + (1− p)Id as usual. Furthermore, assume p
√
T → ν
as T →∞ for some constant ν > 0. Then we have the uniform convergence
f⊗Tp → Gν√χ2(f)
as T →∞, where χ2(f) = ∫ 10 (f ′(x))2 dx− 1.
Lemma B.1. We have
χ2(G1/σ) = e
1/σ2 − 1.
In order to prove Theorem 6, we need an even more general CLT. The first privacy CLT was
introduced in [18]. However, that version is valid only when each component trade-off function is
symmetric, which is not true for pG1/σ + (1− p)Id. In order to state the general CLT that applies
to asymmetric trade-off functions, we need to introduce the following functionals:
kl(f) := −
∫ 1
0
log |f ′(x)|dx
k˜l(f) :=
∫ 1
0
|f ′(x)| log |f ′(x)| dx
κ2(f) :=
∫ 1
0
log2 |f ′(x)|dx
κ˜2(f) :=
∫ 1
0
|f ′(x)| log2 |f ′(x)|dx
κ3(f) :=
∫ 1
0
∣∣ log |f ′(x)|∣∣3 dx
κ˜3(f) :=
∫ 1
0
|f ′(x)| · ∣∣ log |f ′(x)|∣∣3 dx.
Theorem 7. Let {fni : 1 6 i 6 n}∞n=1 be a triangular array of (possibly asymmetric) trade-off
functions and assume the following limits for some constants K > 0 and s > 0 as n→∞:
1.
∑n
i=1 kl(fni) + k˜l(fni)→ K;
2. max16i6n kl(fni)→ 0, max16i6n k˜l(fni)→ 0;
3.
∑n
i=1 κ2(fni)→ s2,
∑n
i=1 κ˜2(fni)→ s2;
4.
∑n
i=1 κ3(fni)→ 0,
∑n
i=1 κ˜3(fni)→ 0.
Then, we have
lim
n→∞ fn1 ⊗ fn2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fnn(α) = GK/s(α)
uniformly for all α ∈ [0, 1].
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Proof of this theorem exactly mimics that of Theorem 3.5 in [18], which we omit here for its
length and tediousness.
Next, we apply the asymmetric CLT to
(
pf + (1− p)Id)⊗T and prove Theorem 6. We start by
collecting the necessary expressions into the following lemma. All of them are straightforward.
Lemma B.2. Let g(x) = −f ′(x)− 1 = |f ′(x)| − 1. Then
kl(fp) = −
∫ 1
0
log(1 + pg(x)) dx
k˜l(fp) =
∫ 1
0
(1 + pg(x)) log(1 + pg(x)) dx
κ2(fp) =
∫ 1
0
[
log
(
1 + pg(x)
)]2
dx
κ˜2(fp) =
∫ 1
0
(
1 + pg(x)
)[
log
(
1 + pg(x)
)]2
dx
κ3(fp) =
∫ 1
0
[
log
(
1 + pg(x)
)]3
dx
κ˜3(fp) =
∫ 1
0
(
1 + pg(x)
)[
log
(
1 + pg(x)
)]3
dx.
Proof of Theorem 6. It suffices to compute the limits in the asymmetric Central Limit Theorem 7,
namely
T · (kl(fp) + k˜l(fp)), T · κ2(fp), T · κ˜2(fp), T · κ3(fp) and T · κ˜3(fp).
Since T ∼ p−2, we can consider p−2(kl(fp) + k˜l(fp)) and so on.
As in Lemma B.2, let g(x) = −f ′(x)− 1 = |f ′(x)| − 1. The assumption expressed in terms of g
is simply ∫ 1
0
g(x)4 dx < +∞.
In particular, it implies |g(x)|k is integrable in [0, 1] for k = 2, 3, 4. In addition, by Lemma B.2,
χ2(f) =
∫ 1
0
(
f ′(x)
)2
dx− 1 =
∫ 1
0
(
f ′(x) + 1
)2
dx =
∫ 1
0
g(x)2 dx.
For the functional kl, by Lemma B.2,
lim
p→0+
1
p2
(
kl(fp) + k˜l(fp)
)
= lim
p→0+
∫ 1
0
g(x) · 1
p
log
(
1 + pg(x)
)
dx (9)
=
∫ 1
0
g(x) · lim
p→0+
1
p
log
(
1 + pg(x)
)
dx
=
∫ 1
0
g(x)2 dx = χ2(f)
Changing the order of the limit and the integral in (9) is approved by the dominated convergence
theorem. To see this, notice that log(1 + x) 6 x. The integrand in (9) satisfies
0 6 g(x) · 1
p
log
(
1 + pg(x)
)
6 g(x)2.
27
We already argued that g(x)2 is integrable, so it works as a dominating function and the limit is
justified. When p
√
T → ν, we have
T · kl(fp)→ ν2 · χ2(f).
So the constant K in Theorem 7 is ν2 · χ2(f).
For the functional κ2 we have
1
p2
κ2(fp) =
∫ 1
0
[1
p
log
(
1 + pg(x)
)]2
dx.
By a similar dominating function argument,
lim
p→0+
1
p2
κ2(fp) = lim
p→0+
1
p2
κ˜2(fp) =
∫ 1
0
g(x)2 dx = χ2(f).
Adding in the limit p
√
T → ν, we know s2 in Theorem 7 is ν2 · χ2(f).
The same argument involving
∣∣g(x)∣∣3 and g(x)4 applies to the functional κ3 and κ˜3 respectively
and yields
lim
p→0+
1
p3
κ3(fp) = lim
p→0+
1
p3
κ˜3(fp) =
∫ 1
0
g(x)3 dx.
Note the different power in p in the denominator. It means κ3(fp) = o(p
2) and hence T ·κ3(fp)→ 0
when p
√
T → ν.
Hence all the limits in Theorem 7 check and we have a Gµ limit where
µ = K/s = s =
√
ν2 · χ2(f) = ν ·
√
χ2(f).
This completes the proof.
We finish the section by proving the formula in Lemma B.1.
Proof of Lemma B.1. The best calculation is done via better understanding. We point out that
the functional χ2 is doing nothing more than computing the famous χ2-divergence. Recall that
Neyman χ2-divergence (reverse Pearson) of P,Q is defined as
χ2(P‖Q) := EP
[
( dQdP − 1)2
]
Lemma B.3. If f = T (P,Q) and f(0) = 1, f(x) > 0, for all x < 1, then χ2(f) = χ2(P‖Q).
This lemma is a straightforward corollary of Proposition B.4 in [18], which gives expressions for
all F -divergence12. In particular, if f = T (P,Q) and f(0) = 1, f(x) > 0,∀x < 1, then F -divergence
of P,Q can be computed from their trade-off function as follows:
DF (P‖Q) =
∫ 1
0
F
(∣∣f ′(x)∣∣−1) · ∣∣f ′(x)∣∣dx.
12We use capital F to avoid confusion with the notation of trade-off function.
28
Neyman χ2-divergence corresponds to F (t) = 1t − 1, so
χ2(P‖Q) =
∫ 1
0
(
1∣∣f ′(x)∣∣−1 − 1
)
· ∣∣f ′(x)∣∣dx
=
∫ 1
0
(
f ′(x)
)2
dx−
∫ 1
0
∣∣f ′(x)∣∣dx
=
∫ 1
0
(
f ′(x)
)2
dx− 1.
With this formula, computing χ2(G1/σ) is straightforward:
χ2(G1/σ) = χ
2
(N ( 1σ , 1)‖N (0, 1)) = e1/σ2 − 1.
B.3 Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
Recall that Theorems 1 and 2 compare our CLT approach to moments accountant (MA) from two
different perspectives: f -DP perspective in Theorem 1 and (ε, δ)-DP perspective in Theorem 2.
We first show that Theorem 1 can be derived from Theorem 2. Then we prove a refined version of
Theorem 2. To be more precise about the statement, let us first expand the notations used in the
main text.
Let δMA(ε;σ, p, T ) be the δ value computed by moment accountant method (described in detail
below) for NoisySGD algorithm with subsampling probability p, iteration T and noise scale σ.
Similarly, δCLT(ε;σ, ν) denotes the δ value computed for the same algorithm using central limit
theorem assuming p
√
T → ν.
Let fT (α) = supε>0 fε,δMA(ε)(α). It is supported by fεT ,δMA(εT ) at α. Theorem 2 says this support-
ing function is smaller than that of GµCLT at α by a strict gap. Taking the limit, lim supT→∞ fT (α)
has at least that much gap from GµCLT(α), which proves Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 is a straightforward corollary of the following proposition. Note that the inequality
is reversed compared to the statement of Theorem 2 so that the gap is positive, which also turns
lim sup into lim inf.
Proposition B.4.
lim inf
T→∞
δMA(ε;σ,
ν√
T
, T )− δCLT(ε;σ, ν) > eε · Φ(− ε
µ
− µ
2
)
where µ = ν ·
√
e1/σ2 − 1.
Let us first describe how the two methods compute δ from ε.
δnMA(ε;σ, p, T ) := inf
λ∈orders
exp (T · αGM(λ;σ, p)− λε)
δMA(ε;σ, p, T ) := inf
λ>0
exp (T · αGM(λ;σ, p)− λε)
where αGM(λ;σ, p) is a scaled version of the Re´nyi divergence of Gaussian mixtures. More specif-
ically, let P = N (0, 1) and Q = N ( 1σ , 1). We further denote the Gaussian mixture pQ + (1 − p)P
by GMp,σ. The
αGM(λ;σ, p) = max
{
λDλ+1(GMp,σ‖P ), λDλ+1(P‖GMp,σ)
}
.
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In [3], it has been shown that Algorithm 1 (hence also the Adam variant, Algorithm 2) with sub-
sampling probability p, iteration T and noise scale σ is (ε, δ)-DP for each ε > 0 if δ = δMA(ε;σ, p, T ).
To evaluate the infimum, the domain is discretized13. This results in the numerical moment ac-
countant method that is actually implemented. Since δnMA(ε;σ, p, T ) > δMA(ε;σ, p, T ), Algorithm 1
is also (ε, δ)-DP with δ = δnMA(ε;σ, p, T ).
On the other hand, δCLT(ε;σ, ν) is obtained by first observing Algorithm 1 is asymptotically
µCLT-GDP with µCLT = ν ·
√
e1/σ2 − 1 and then convert GDP to (ε, δ)-DP via Equation (6), i.e.
Algorithm 1 asymptotically satisfies (ε, δ)-DP where
δ = δCLT(ε;σ, ν) = 1 +G
∗
µCLT(−eε).
We have just explained how MA and CLT works. Next we prove Proposition B.4
Proof of Proposition B.4. Let fT =
(
pGµ+(1−p)Id
)⊗T
. We need a lemma (whose proof is provided
later) that relates the Re´nyi divergence to the trade-off function fT .
Lemma B.5.
T · αGM(λ;σ, p) > log
∫ 1
0
|f ′T (x)|λ+1 dx.
Let xT ∈ (0, 1) be the point such that f ′T (xT ) = −eε (or xT ∈ ∂f∗T (−eε) if readers worry about
differentiability). We have
1 + f∗T (−eε) = sup
06x61
{1− fT (x)− eεx} = 1− fT (xT )− eεxT
It is clear that |f ′T (x)| > eε for 0 6 x 6 xT .
On the other hand, using Lemma B.5, we get
δMA(ε;σ, p, T ) = inf
λ>0
exp (T · αGM(λ;σ, p)− λε)
> inf
λ>0
e−λε
∫ 1
0
|f ′T (x)|λ+1 dx
> inf
λ>0
∫ xT
0
|f ′T (x)|λ+1e−λε dx
= inf
λ>0
∫ xT
0
|f ′T (x)| · |f ′T (x)|λe−λε dx
> inf
λ>0
∫ xT
0
|f ′T (x)| · (eε)λe−λε dx
= fT (0)− fT (xT )
= 1− fT (xT )
=
(
1− fT (xT )− eεxT
)
+ eεxT
= 1 + f∗T (−eε) + eεxT .
In summary, we have
δMA(ε;σ, p, T ) > 1 + f
∗
T (−eε) + eεxT . (10)
13Code in tensorflow/privacy discretizes at [1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2., 2.25, 2.5, 3., 3.5, 4., 4.5, 5, 6, 7, . . . , 63, 64, 128, 256, 512].
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Setting p = ν√
T
, we would like to take limit on both sides of (10). First notice that fT converge
pointwise to GµCLT , which we have already proven in Appendix B.2. The limit of xT is taken care
of in the following lemma:
Lemma B.6.
lim
T→∞
xT = x
∗ := Φ(− ε
µCLT
− µCLT
2
).
Combining these results, we can take limits on both sides of (10):
lim inf
T→∞
δMA(ε;σ, p, T ) > lim
T→∞
1 + f∗T (−eε) + eεxT
= 1 +G∗µCLT(−eε) + eεx∗
= δCLT(ε;σ, ν) + e
ε · Φ(− ε
µCLT
− µCLT
2
).
This finishes the proof.
Proof of Lemma B.5. The Re´nyi divergence can also be computed from the trade-off function, just
like the χ2-divergence. In fact, under the same assumptions as in Lemma B.1, we have
Dα(Q‖P ) = 1
α− 1 log
∫ 1
0
|f ′(x)|α−1 dx.
Alternatively,
λDλ+1(Q‖P ) = log
∫ 1
0
|f ′(x)|λ dx. (11)
This identity will be the bridge between αGM and fT .
On one hand, αGM(λ;σ, p) is the maximum of two Re´nyi divergences, so
αGM(λ;σ, p) > λDλ+1(pQ+ (1− p)P‖P )
Consequently,
T · αGM(λ;σ, p) > TλDλ+1(pQ+ (1− p)P‖P )
= λDλ+1
(
(pQ+ (1− p)P )T ‖P T ).
The last step is the tensorization identity of Re´nyi divergence.
On the other hand, notice that pGµ + (1 − p)Id = T
(
P,GMp,σ
)
where we continue the use of
notations P = N (0, 1), Q = N ( 1σ , 1) and GMp,σ = pQ+ (1− p)P . We have
fT =
(
pGµ + (1− p)Id
)⊗T
= T
(
P, (pQ+ (1− p)P ))⊗T = T (P T , (pQ+ (1− p)P )T )
Using (11), we have
T · αGM(λ;σ, p) > λDλ+1
(
(pQ+ (1− p)P )T ‖P T )
= log
∫ 1
0
|f ′T (x)|λ dx.
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Proof of Lemma B.6. By definition, f ′T (xT ) = −eε. The convexity of fT implies ∇f∗T (−eε) = xT .
Since fT converges uniformly to GµCLT in [0, 1], we have uniform convergence f
∗
T → G∗µCLT .
By convexity of these functions, the convergence also implies the convergence of derivatives (See
Theorem 25.7 of [51]), namely,
∇f∗T → ∇G∗µCLT .
Therefore,
xT = ∇f∗T (−eε)→ ∇G∗µCLT(−eε).
Let x∗ = ∇G∗µCLT(−eε) be the limit. Using the convexity again, we have
−eε = G′µCLT(x∗).
We can solve for x∗ using the expression of Gµ (6). After some algebra, we have
x∗ = Φ(− ε
µCLT
− µCLT
2
).
The proof is complete.
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